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STEPPARENTS' RESPONSIBILITY OF SUPPORT
Janet Mary Riley*
WHO IS A STEPPARENT?
There may have been a time when it was fairly safe to assume that
a stepparent was one who had married a widow or a widower who had
a child or children. This included an assumption of a previous marriage,
and its termination by a death.
With the increase in divorce and remarriage' -possibly including a
series of sequential marriages-more and more men and women possess
the status of stepparent though there was a divorce instead of death ter-
minating the marriage of the parent of the child.
The very dictionary definition of a stepchild as the child of one's
wife or husband by a former marriage assumed there had been a mar-
riage in the past.2 Yet with the increase of illegitimate births followed
by marriage of the mother to a man other than the father of the child,
more men may possess the status of stepfather though there was no
previous marriage of the mother of the child.3  With the increase in
births through new methods of procreation, more men and women may
possess the status of stepparents who perhaps never contemplated such
a relationship.4
Who, then, is a stepparent? The spouse of a parent of a child not
his or her offspring is a stepparent.
How does one become a stepparent? One necessary factor is parent-
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author wishes to acknowledge with sincere thanks the valuable research assistance of Mary
Jane Goodwynne and Elisabeth M. Tetlow, third-year law students at Loyola University
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1. In 1963, 66.31074 of all terminated marriages ended by death and 33.69% by divorce.
By 1979 only 42.7707o terminated by death, while 57.2300 ended by legal dissolution. For
half a decade the ratio of marriages to dissolution has been about 2 to 1. The latest figures
were 2,438,000 marriages and 1,219,000 divorces in 1981. The 2 to I ratio contrasts with
1930, when there were 6 marriages to every dissolution. Unif. Marital Prop. Act, prefatory
note, 9A U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 1983).
2. Webster's New International Dictionary 2237 (3d ed. 1976); Black's Law Dictionary
1267 (5th ed. 1979).
3. Stepchildren may be defined differently for different purposes, e.g., Louisiana's
Workers' Compensation Law includes stepchildren within the definition of "child," La.
R.S. 23:1021(3) (Supp. 1984); but the unacknowledged illegitimate children of a deceased
employee's wife by another man were held not to have been intended by the legislature
to be included among those who could receive compensation for his death; they were not
alleged to be members of his family nor dependent upon him. Dangerfield v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 209 La. 195, 24 So. 2d 375 (1945). See also Annot., 90 A.L.R. 2d 583 (1963).
4. See generally Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for
Litigation, 35 S.W. L.J. 973 (1982); Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Ter-
ritory for Legislation, 44 La. L. Rev. 1641 (1984).
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hood of the other spouse. But it is not clear that the blood' parent must
have married the other blood parent of the child, though this is usually
the case when the potential stepparent marries the parent of a legitimate
child. If there had been no marriage between the blood parents of the
child, the spouse of one parent becomes the stepparent of an illegitimate
child, that is, one born out of wedlock. 6
Will the husband of a woman artificially inseminated by another man's
sperm be classed as a stepfather? He is not the blood father and he is
married to the mother, but in Louisiana if the husband consented to the
insemination, he is irrebuttably presumed to be the legitimate father of
the child, and therefore not a stepfather.7 This may not be true in some
states.
The wife of a man whose sperm produced a child in a surrogate
mother's womb will probably be classed as a stepmother though she in-
tended to be considered the mother. A stepmother may be one to whose
uterus an embryo has been transplanted after fertilization by her husband's
sperm of another woman's egg, that woman having been a sort of "tem-
porary" surrogate mother.'
Who is not a stepparent? An adoptive parent is not a stepparent,
having voluntarily accepted responsibility for the adopted child in a man-
ner specified by statute with resulting effects that vary from state to state,
but which usually give the child a status similar in most respects to that
of a child born to the parent. 9 Foster parents are not stepparents, as they
usually are not married to a blood parent of the child; they may be ex-
pected, however, to perform the duties of a parent.'" One who is pre-
sumed to be the legitimate parent of a child, and who is irrebuttably bar-
red from disproving that presumption is not a stepparent; rather, such
a person is charged with the full responsibilites of a blood parent."
A stepchild may or may not be living with his parent and stepparent.
His living arrangements may be informal or may be dictated by a court
5. Though most writers speak of the "natural" parent and the "natural" child, this
author has chosen to use the term "blood" parent and "blood" child, because until Act
607 of 1979 repealed Civil Code article 202, illegitimate children who had been acknow-
ledged by their-father were called natural children; others were "contradistinguished by the
appellation of bastards." The term was also found throughout the Code before 1979, and
remains in article 949 today. The term "blood parent" is used in article 214 concerning
adoptions, and "blood .. . relations" in article 902 concerning successions.
6. Annot., 90 A.L.R. 2d 583 (1983); 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards § 69 (1963).
7. La. Civ. Code art. 188; cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12:2415B (1982); Cal. Civ. Code
§ 7005(a) (West 1983); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975). See Unif. Parentage
Act § 5, 9A U.L.A. 592 (1973).
8. See supra note 4.
9. E.g., La. Civ. Code art. 214.
10. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 20, 154.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 188. See Cal. Civ. Code § 7005(b) (West 1983).
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order of sole custody to one or the other of his parents or to another
relative, joint custody to both parents, or custody to a foster home or
an institution.
SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
After one has determined that he is in fact a stepparent, if he then
searches the law for a description of his legal support responsibilites, if
any, toward the child in question, his findings will vary from state to
state. 2
This paper primarily concerns the effect of the recently revised com-
munity property law of Louisiana 3 on the support responsibilites of step-
parents in this state. The very specific reimbursement articles in that
revision 4 alerted this author to the possibililty that a person marrying
a parent and years later divorcing that parent might discover that he had
incurred what might be a huge debt to his former spouse upon divorce
for support of his stepchildren who may not have lived in his household,
and whom he may never have seen. A desire to bring this Civil Code
article to the attention of stepparents and of counselors advising them
initiated a search for stepparents' legal support responsibilites. At first
this author questioned only whether such a duty, if it is to exist in Loui-
siana, should be direct and easy to find, instead of indirect and depen-
dent upon the property system (that is, the matrimonial regime) adopted
by the couple or imposed upon them by law. Not surprisingly, that nar-
row study soon extended into unexpected areas including how the matter
is handled in other community property states and in common-law states
without community property; the effect on the stepparent in some states
of the child's probability of becoming a public charge; the effect of ac-
cepting the child into one's home; the distinction between court ordered
responsibility on the part of the parent-spouse with or without custody
or joint custody; the measure of support as affected by remarriage with
its accompanying new responsibilites; and resulting policy questions.
As more and more families include his children, her children, and
their children, it is hoped this article can aid in clarification of the resulting
support responsibilites. Once the situation is more clearly viewed, policy
decisions can be more equitably determined.
LOUISIANA-THE COMMUNITY REGIME
The new (as of 1980) Louisiana Civil Code article that stirred this
12. Annot., 75 A.L.R. 2d 1129 (1977). For matters other than support, see Berkowitz,
Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Relationship: Cinderella Revisited, 4 Fam. L. Q. 209
(1970) (treating workers' compensation, wrongful death, insurance, welfare, and descent
and distribution-testate and intestate).
13. La. Civ. Code arts. 2325-2437.
14. La. Civ. Code arts. 2364-2369.
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author's interest in the problem of stepparents' support responsibilites is
article 2365, which states:
If separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a com-
munity obligation, the spouse, upon termination of the community
property regime, is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the
amount or value that the property had at the time it was used.
Reimbursement may only be made to the extent of community
assets, unless the community obligation was incurred for the or-
dinary and customary expenses of marriage, or for the support,
maintenance, and education of children of either spouse in keep-
ing with the economic condition of the community. In the last
case, the spouse is entitled to reimbursement from the other spouse
even if there are no community assets. 5
As of this writing, the article has not had the benefit of appellate
level interpretation, but its wording is clear. Its first paragraph, in effect,
excuses a spouse from a duty of reimbursement to the other spouse for
extraordinary community obligations paid with separate funds unless reim-
bursement can be made from any remaining community funds; by con-
trast, its second paragraph requires that ordinary community obligations
paid with one spouse's separate funds be reimbursed upon termination
of the community from the other spouse's separate funds if community
funds are insufficient. The article can be justified, if at all, by recogni-
tion that insofar as it governs support of children, it is a method of en-
forcing the new (1980) Civil Code article 23626 which deems an alimen-
tary obligation to be a community obligation. How that article came to
be is chronicled below. But first, consider a scenario for which the denoue-
ment is enforcement of article 2365's requirement of reimbursement.
Young professional woman marries the father of children in the
custody of their mother, his first wife. Husband, with extensive separate
investments, exercises the privilege newly extended by Civil Code article
2339 to husbands since 1980" of unilaterally executing an authentic act
reserving to himself as separate property the fruits, revenues, and mineral
rights produced from his separate assets. He avoids commingling such
dividends, interest, rents, crops, and royalties with community assets by
depositing them in a checking account in his name alone, designated as
a separate account. He draws all checks for child support on that separate
account. Community funds earned by the personal efforts of the spouses
are used for other current expenses, leaving little to be divided upon ter-
mination of the second marriage. Upon divorce, husband seeks reimburse-
ment from his second wife of one-half the value of all the checks he has
15. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 2362.
17. La. Civ. Code art. 2339.
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been sending to the custodial parent for his children. There are insuffi-
cient community funds to repay him, hence young professional second
wife will leave her first marriage saddled with a heavy debt to former
husband to be paid from her future earnings in her professional practice."
One wonders about motives. Why did he so scrupulously pay child
support only from his separate funds? Probably because he then assumed
it was his separate obligation. Why does he now decide he wants reim-
bursement? Probably because he has just learned that it is available to
him at this unhappy time, or possibly as a bargaining chip to persuade
his second wife to agree to something he wants: perhaps custody or joint
custody of the child of the second marriage, or an agreement concerning
that child's support or concerning alimony, or a partition settlement of
a certain community asset he wants to keep. It may be vindictive, or
perhaps he simply wants the money. In any event, such a duty imposed
by law on a stepparent, it is submitted, was probably anticipated by neither
spouse before or during the marriage. In fact, if the stepmother had
searched Louisiana law to learn whether her marriage would constitute
an assumption of responsibilites toward his children, she would have found
nothing in the title of the Louisiana Civil Code, "Of Father and Child,"' 9
though that is the section that imposes reciprocal duties of support for
ascendants and descendants related by blood, legitimate2" or illegimate,"'
or by adoption.22 (Incidentally, there is no title "Of Mother and Child.").
Had she searched in an old code, she would have relaxed when she found
article 269, repealed in 1976,23 in the title, "Of Minors, Of Their Tutor-
ship and Emancipation.""4 It declared that "[u]nder the name relation
are not included connections by affinity,"" and affinity is the "[relation
which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the
other," '2 6 a definition which includes steprelatives.
If she had been sufficiently astute to suspect that, though the title
on parent and child imposed no responsibilty for stepchildren, the com-
munity property articles may affect her relationship not only to her hus-
band, and his creditors, but also to his dependents, she would have
discovered article 2362: "[a]n alimentary obligation imposed by law on
a spouse is deemed to be a community obligation."" Learning that
18. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
19. La. Civ. Code arts. 178-245.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 229.
21. La. Civ. Code arts. 239-40.
22. La. Civ. Code art. 214.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 269, repealed by 1976 La. Acts, No. 429, § 2.
24. La. Civ. Code arts. 246-385.
25. La. Civ. Code art. 269, repealed by 1976 La. Acts No. 429, § 2.
26. Black's Law Dictionary 80 (4th ed. 1951).
27. La. Civ. Code art. 2362.
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"alimentary" is the adjective form of alimony or sustenance,28 and in spite
of the general public's misunderstanding that alimony is for former spouses
only, she would have found Civil Code article 230 which defines it: "[b]y
alimony we understand what is necessary for the nourishment, lodging
and support of the person who claims it. It includes the education, when
the person to whom the alimony is due, is a minor." 29 She would have
learned that the duty of such support is reciprocal between relatives in
the ascending and descending lines,3" and that "[flathers and mothers,
by the very act of marrying, contract together the obligation of support-
ing, maintaining, and educating their children."'" She would have
wondered whether "their children" refers to the children of the marriage,
or instead means that by marrying, the spouses contract to support each
other's children though not of that marriage, and she would have decided
that conclusion would be improbable as the article refers to "fathers and
mothers." Although she is about to marry a father, she is not yet a
mother, and his children are not her descendants from whom she could
expect reciprocal support in the future. Just to be sure, she would have
searched and found the last article in the Civil Code,32 with definitions
of terms including children33 and family.3" Though both definitions were
amended in 1979 and that of children amended again in 1981, both old
and new definitions would have satisfied her that his children are not
hers, and that a family in a limited sense signifies father, mother, and
children, and she is not a mother.
When she found Civil Code article 234535 she would have been satisfied
that her separate property was immune from her prospective husband's
creditors, for it permits satisfaction of both separate and community
obligations during a community regime only from community property
and from the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obliga-
tion. She would have noted the similarity of that article to the first
paragraph of article 2357,36 applying the same rule at termination of the
community. She would have noted that by her own act she could forfeit
the immunity of her separate property and expose it to her husband's
separate creditors at termination of the community, but only by dispos-
ing of property of the former community for a purpose other than satisfac-
28. Webster's New International Dictionary 2304 (3d 1976).
29. La. Civ. Code art. 230; see generally La. Civ. Code arts. 227, 229, 231-234; on
illegitimates, see generally La. Civ. Code arts. 240-244.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 229.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 227.
32. La. Civ. Code art. 3556.
33. La. Civ. Code art. 3556(8), as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § I & 1981
La. Acts, No. 919, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 1982).
34. La. Civ. Code art. 3556(12), as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 711, § 1.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 2345.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 2357, para. 1.
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tion of community obligations or by a written assumption of responsibil-
ity for one-half of the community obligations incurred by her husband.37
She would have done her research well, insofar as it concerned possi-
ble burdening of her separate property in favor of her husband's separate
creditors or even community creditors for debts incurred by him. Her
separate property was safe from creditors except by her own act. She
was not anticipating a divorce, so may not have researched claims for
reimbursements between the spouses. 8 Her separate property could not
be reached by her husband's creditors including her stepchildren, but if
her husband supported them with his separate property, he could at ter-
mination of the community demand reimbursement of one-half of his
separate funds thus expended. Although his obligation to support his
children is deemed a community obligation, he could demand reimburse-
ment not only from both halves of the community, but also from her
separate funds. 9
If the community regime and the marriage in the scenario terminated
not by separation from bed and board nor by divorce, but by the death
of the husband, the husband's child will be his heir and will succeed to
the property, separate and community, in the husband's intestate
succession."0 His stepmother will have a usufruct over the child's share
of the community property, which usufruct will terminate when she
remarries." Her debt to her husband is a heritable right of his separate
estate. 2 Hence the child who was supported by his father's separate prop-
erty will upon his father's death have a right to be paid by his stepmother
a sum of money equal to one-half of all the support payments made dur-
ing his father's second marriage.
If the child has predeceased his father and there are no other descen-
dants, the surviving wife will succeed to the deceased's share of the com-
munity property, 3 and she will owe reimbursement of the support
payments to the heirs of his separate estate.
Although nowhere in Louisiana law are stepparents directly made
separately responsible for support of stepchildren, at termination of their
community regime they must repay to their spouse or his heir one-half
of the separate funds the parent has used to fulfill the parental duty.44
Support is a reciprocal duty" between parent and child, but is not legally
37. La. Civ. Code art. 2357, paras. I & 2.
38. La. Civ. Code arts. 2358, 2364-2369.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
40. La. Civ. Code art. 888.
41. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
42. La. Civ. Code art. 2365, comment (b); La. Civ. Code art. 1997, 1999.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 889.
44. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
45. La. Civ. Code art. 229.
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reciprocal to the stepparent from the child in his adult life; the stepparent's
burden is not a consequence of a relationship to the child, but apparently
is classed as an ordinary expense of marriage to be borne equally by both
spouses at the end of the community, though the duty is not equal either
at its origin or in its reciprocity.
This author has no knowledge of the legislative intent in enacting the
reimbursement article for ordinary expenses and for support of children,"'
but was present at a meeting of the Joint Legislative Sub-Committee and
its advisory committee when the 1978 predecessor 7 to article 2362 was
drafted, declaring alimentary obligations to be community obligations. 8
The advisory committee brought to the attention of the legislators the
then recent 1976 Louisiana Supreme Court opinion in Connell v. Connell."9
When a husband sued for a partition of the property of their former
community, the wife contended that the almost $28,000 he had paid as
child support to his first wife from the second community's earnings should
be chargeable to the husband's half interest in the second community.
The supreme court disagreed holding that the payments were not in
discharge of a debt, but of an obligation, and that the obligation was
one imposed by law rather than by the judgment, and was properly
discharged from community funds.5" Apparently some members of the
advisory committee wished that precedent to be legislatively rejected in
the revision. Instead, the legislators asked for copies of the opinion to
be made available to them during the lunch break, and returned with
a draft of an article legislatively confirming the Connell holding, deeming
alimentary obligations to be community obligations. 5' One legislator ex-
plained that if a husband knew that he would some day be required to
46. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
47. La. R.S. 9:2852(G), repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627.
48. La. Civ. Code art. 2362.
49. 331 So. 2d 4 (La. 1976).
50. 331 So. 2d. at 6. The same result-but based on a different rationale-occurred
in California in Marriage of Smaltz, 82 Cal. App. 3d, 147 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1978). A second
wife was refused reimbursement, to her or to the community, of $16,200.00 of community
funds used, allegedly without her consent, by her husband for spousal support payments
to his former wife. Because the husband had no separate funds, the California court of
appeal distinguished this situation from that in Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. App. 2d
557, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13, 432 P.2d 709 (1967), in which the Supreme Court of California
held that the marital community was entitled to partial reimbursement for the husband's
use of community funds to meet the obligations of alimony for his former wife and child
support, when the measure of his obligation had been based on both his community and
separate incomes. The second community in Weinberg recouped that portion charged to
his separate estate by determining his total separate and community incomes during the
second marriage, including unrealized capital increases. The court stated that "[i]t would
be unjust to plaintiff to allow defendant to preserve his separate estate by using only com-
munity funds to meet alimony and child support obligations totalling more than $130,000
that were substantially based on his large separate income." Id. at 16.
51. La. Civ. Code art. 2362.
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repay his wife or her heirs one half of the community money he was
sending to his first wife for his children, he would have no incentive to
save during the second marriage, as most of the savings would some day
go to his second wife, not to him.
Only alimony for children has been emphasized thus far, as this arti-
cle concerns stepparents' responsibility, but it is worthy of note that
alimony is deemed to be a community obligation whether it is owed to
children, to a former spouse,52 to parents, or to other ascendants and
descendants. Moreover, the duty of providing support for designated
people is imposed by law without a judgment; the court is only the means
of enforcement. Reimbursement from the separate funds of the stepparent
spouse is required only for those cases in which separate funds of the
blood parent have been used to pay ordinary expenses of the marriage
and alimony for children, not alimony for wives or ascendants.
Admittedly, the Connell case was not the first to relate alimony to
community property. Other cases had found that a second marriage with
creation of a new community regime constituted such a change of cir-
cumstances as to enable a father under a duty of support to pay a greater
amount, because his new wife's income had become available for his use.
Similarly, a mother has been refused an increase or required to take a
decrease in child support because her second husband's income has en-
riched her. 3
LOUISIANA-THE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY REGIME
Not surprisingly, some couples have attempted to avoid having the
measure of ability to pay alimony by one spouse enlarged by the earnings
52. Compare Connell v. Connell, 331 So. 2d 4 (La. 1976) and La. Civ. Code art.
2362 with Patterson v. Patterson, 417 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), in which alimony
pendente lite was held to be the husband's separate debt [sic], not to be paid from the
property of the community then in process of partition, because the community regime
was dissolved retroactively to the date of filing suit. The community had ceased to exist
when the payments were made. Hence, alimony to a first wife is a community obligation
of a second community, but not of the recipient's former community.
53. In Marcus v. Burnett, 282 So. 2d 122 (La. 1973), both parents of three children
had remarried persons who already had children. The first wife obtained an increase in
child support but not as much as she sought.
[T~he court of appeal opinion expressly took into consideration the living expenses
incident to the second marriage of Mr. Burnett (as well as his income and that
of his second wife) in their determination of the amount of support for which
he was liable. ..
Moreover, this court has previously recognized that the income of a second
wife is to be considered in determining the husband's obligation to support children
of his first marriage. . . . It would be unfair to allow consideration of additional
income made possible by a second marriage while disallowing consideration of
the expenses of that marriage. . ..
.. . While Mr. Marcus has no legal obligation to support the children in ques-
19841 1761
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of the other by electing not to have a legal community of acquets and
gains. This technique did not succeed in Finley v. Finley4 in 1974, but
it did in Alt v. Alt" in 1983, both of which are appellate court cases
arising in different circuits and during different eras of law. The Loui-
siana Supreme Court has acted on this matter only in refusing writs without
comment in Barnes v. Rosen.56
In Finley, the parties had stipulated that Mr. Finley and his second
wife were living under a separate property regime, but the contract was
not introduced and its terms were unknown to the court. Nonetheless,
the court found that though such a contract may determine how expenses
are to be shared, it was not necessary for the court to review its provi-
sions as it "should not circumvent our policies governing the payment
of child support," 7 and that "it is indeed proper to consider the separate
earnings of the second wife when those earnings are available for pay-
ment of expenses incidental to the second marriage." 58 Thus the father's
child support payments to his first wife were increased by the first circuit59
because of the stepmother's earnings, though the couple lived under a
separate regime.
The fourth circuit rejected the Finley rationale in the Alt case." It
increased the father's support duties and refused his request to admit
evidence of the income of the mother's second husband because her
prenuptial contract provided for a separate property regime. The agree-
ment was silent as to expenses of the marriage, so each spouse had to
contribute in proportion to his or her means.' Though the second hus-
band, the stepfather, in fact had contributed to the expenses of the family
home in which the children resided, the court would not conclude that
this enhanced the mother's ability to support her children as she was not
the recipient of any community income. 62 The fourth circuit in Alt
reasserted its holding in Barnes v. Rosen, in which it had refused to con-
sider the mother's second husband's income in determining the measure
tion [his stepchildren, his second wife's children], this court simply will not blind
itself to the reality that the mother [his first wife], who does have a legal obliga-
tion to support her children, has married a capable provider who has enhanced
her opportunity to furnish a portion of the support of the children in her
custody. ...
. . . [Tihe court should consider the totality of the circumstances involved.
282 So. 2d at 124-25.
54. 305 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
55. 433 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
56. 359 So. 2d 1133 (La. App. 4th Cir), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1120 (La. 1978).
57. 305 So. 2d at 657.
58. 305 So. 2d at 657.
59. 305 So. 2d at 654.
60. 433 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
61. La. Civ. Code art. 2373.
62. 433 So. 2d at 402.
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of her duty of support because it would not "go beyond ' 63 a marriage
contract creating a separation of property regime. The Louisiana Supreme
Court refused writs in Barnes.
ABSTRUSE DISTINCTIONS
In a separation of property regime, expenses are distinguished from
necessaries in the 1980 revision of the law concerning matrimonial regimes.
For necessaries, spouses in a separate regime now are solidarily liable to
creditors. 6" This is probably unchangeable by matrimonial agreement
because it affects the rights of others. 65 For expenses generally, the spouses
are responsible to each other as determined by their contract, or if it is
silent concerning expenses, they are responsible to each other in propor-
tion to their respective means,6 6 apparently even during the marriage. But
if they have a legal regime of community of acquets and gains, only at
its termination are they responsible to each other for community expenses
satisfied with separate property beyond the value of the remaining com-
munity property, that is, from separate property. The distinction in the
latter case is not between necessaries and expenses, but between community
obligations in general, and community obligations "for the ordinary and
customary expenses of marriage, or for the support, maintenance, and
education of children of either spouse in keeping with the economic con-
dition of the community." 67
POLICY QUESTIONS
It is evident that in Louisiana a stepparent has no responsibility of
support directly toward a stepchild. 61 Yet his or her income and means
have been a factor in measuring the amount of support a court will de-
mand of the blood parent in a community regime, 69 although the circuits
differ as to whether it should be a factor in a separate regime. 0 But it
is clear that the stepparent has an obligation, not directly toward the child,
but toward his or her spouse at termination of a community regime, to
reimburse from separate property one half of the support expenses paid
by the blood parent with separate funds. 7'
63. 359 So. 2d at 1135.
64. 433 So. 2d at 402; La, Civ. Code art. 2372.
65. La. Civ. Code art. 11.
66. La. Civ. Code art. 2373.
67. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
68. "Mrs. Brechtel's present husband has no legal obligation to support her children
from a previous marriage .... LeBouef v. LeBouef, 325 So. 2d 290, 294 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1975). "[Nleither the stepmother nor the stepfather have any legal obligation to
support the children." Vinet v. Vinet, 184 So. 2d 33, 35 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
69. Barnes v. Rosen, 359 So. 2d 1133 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
70. Finley v. Finley, 305 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Alt v. Alt, 433 So.
2d 400 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Barnes v. Rosen, 359 So. 2d 1133 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
71. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
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Should a stepparent's responsibilty differ depending on whether the
couple has a community or a separate regime? Should a child's standard
of living depend on whether or not one of his parents in a second mar-
riage has contractually created a separate regime with or without a clause
concerning expenses, or has created a modified community regime? Should
a spouse of a parent be directly responsible for stepchildren, or clearly
without responsibility, not only to the child but to the spouse, during
and at termination of a community regime? Should the law be clear and
easy to locate, instead of circuitous, indirect, and hidden in reimburse-
ment rights of spouses at termination? These are policy questions not
directly faced by the legislature. As more marriage partners become step-
parents in today's society, what solutions can be offered?
PRACTICE IN OTHER STATES
No Duty
At common law, stepparents were under no duty to support their
stepchildren.72 Of the forty-two states without community property, eigh-
teen have not imposed a statutory duty of support on stepparents.73 Several
of them have recognized the fact of a child's dependence upon his step-
parent as a basis for the child's claim for workers' compensation benefits
upon the stepparent's death.' Tennessee gives a stepparent visitation rights
by statute.75 Many others have no reference to the step-relationship.
Duty in Loco Parentis
A few states that have not imposed a statutory duty toward step-
children have held judicially that when a stepparent voluntarily acts toward
a child as though he were a parent, such action constitutes the status
in loco parentis, and thereafter the stepparent is obliged to continue to
fulfill the usual obligations of a parent as long as he permits the child
to remain in his home.76 Perhaps the justification for investing a person
related by affinity with the obligations of a blood parent is analogous
to an estoppel concept-having permitted the child and the community
to expect parental services, the stepparent is not allowed to frustrate these
72. C. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations (1968); Annot., 75 A.L.R. 3d 1132 (1977),
citing 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child § 91 (1971).
73. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
74. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1064 (1983); Florida, Mississippi, Pennsylvania.
75. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-837 (Supp. 1983).
76. Franklin v. Franklin, 75 Ariz. 151, 253 P.2d 337 (1953). See Trotter v. Pollan,
311 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); accord, Neisen v. Niesen, 38 Wis. 2d 599, 157
N.W.2d 660, 32 A.L.R. 3d 1047 (1970); Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States:
An Overview, 17 Fam. L. Q. 365, 422 (1984).
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expections. It may instead be analogous to the position of a volunteer
rescuer who, having begun the task, is expected to complete it without
further injuring the one in need. Nonetheless, courts have not precipi-
tately found stepparents to be in loco parentis without a clear history
creating an atmosphere of reliance."
Statutory Duty
The states that have imposed a statutory duty of support upon step-
parents do so with dissimilar kinds of statutes. A few have confirmed
by statute the duties that arise from the voluntary status of in loco parentis,
rather than depending on judicial precedent. 8 Thirteen states have im-
posed a direct duty of support resulting from the mere status of
stepparent, 9 but many of these impose the duty for only so long as the
marriage lasts.8
Two states impose the duty of support upon a stepparent only if the
stepchild is in need.' There is a history to this approach. At one time,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children was customarily refused if
another person in the household was able to support the children, and
several states amended their welfare laws to implement that so-called "man-
in-the-house" rule. However, the Office of Family Assistance, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, amended the regulations to provide
that the right to AFDC could not be refused if there was a child deprived
of parental support, except in relation to a natural or adoptive parent
or a stepparent who is legally obligated to support the child under a state
law of general applicabilty.8 2 Laws in several states were in conflict with
this regulation.83 For instance, in one state stepfathers were required to
tender support, but stepmothers were not;8" therefore the law was not
one of general applicability, and aid could not be refused. Some of these
77. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child § 91 (1971).
78. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 57-633b; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 577-4 (1976); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 40-6-217 (1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4 (Supp. 1983); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-09
(Supp. 1983); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 15 (West 1966).
79. Del. Code Ann. tit. 113, § 501 (1981); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, § 51-52 (1966); Iowa
Code Ann. §§ 252A.2-252A.3 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 568.040 (1979);
Neb. Rev. Stat §§ 28-705 (1979), 43-512 (1978); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 546A:l Subd.
4, 546A:2 (1976); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:6-1-9:6-2 (West 1976), 9:6-8.21 (West Supp. 1983);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.053(1981); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-7-30, 20-7-40, (Law Co-Op. Supp.
1983); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-7-8 (Supp. 1983); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1 (Supp.
1983); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 291 (Supp. 1983).
80. Delaware, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, Utah, and Vermont.
81. Alaska Stat. § 47.25.320 (1979); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act art. 4, § 415 (McKinney 1983).
82. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a)(1) (1983). See Duran v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Ser-
vices, 95 N.M. 188, 619 P.2d 1232 (1980).
83. E.g., Ojeda v. Hackney, 319 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (concerning Texas).
84. Gaither v. Sterret, 346 F. Supp. 1095 (W.D. Ind. 1972). Cf. Ind. Code Ann. §
12-1-2-12 (Burns Supp. 1984), 12-1-2-13 (Burns 1981).
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statutes may remain on the books8" but cannot be used for their original
purpose of furnishing an excuse for refusing aid, because in conflict with
the federal regulations. Nonetheless, such statutes could be enforced against
the stepparents if the child is in need.
Several states have adopted the proposed Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act,86 but with local modifications. Several states impose criminal
penalties upon stepparents who do not fulfill the statutory duty of sup-
porting their stepchildren. 7
Community Property States-Equitable Division
Arizona
Arizona law permits a court in a proceeding for dissolution of a mar-
riage to order parents to support a child born to or adopted by the
parents.88 The Arizona court declared that the article did not apply to
the wife's children of a prior marriage who had not been adopted by
her husband and thus should not affect his alimony obligation to her. 9
Since that decision, the statute was amended to permit a court in such
a proceeding to "impress a lien upon the separate property of either party
or the marital property awarded to either party to secure the payment
of an allowance for child support or spousal maintenance or both." 9
Apparently, separate property can become such security only for the child
born to or adopted by the owner of the separate property, though the
statute refers to "either party."
Remarriage of parents did not justify reduction in a father's child
support obligation, though he had thereby voluntarily incurred new debts
and the mother's new husband's income was equivalent to the father's.9
However, the Arizona Workmen's Compensation statute permits step-
parents to be regarded as parents, and stepchildren to be regarded as
natural children if dependent.2 Nothing was located in the law of Arizona
comparable to Louisiana's Civil Code article 2365, nor concerning
necessaries and education of the spouses' children.
85. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under California's Community Property
Laws: Recommendations for Reform, 34 Hastings L.J. 229, 256 (1982) (referring to Cal.
Civ. Code §§ 5127.5, 5127.6 (West 1983)).
86. California, Maine, New Hampshire, and Utah.
87. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 709-903 (1976); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-705 (1979); N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 9:6-2 (West 1976), 9:6-8:21 (West Supp. 1983); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-7-30, 20-7-40
(Supp. 1983).
88. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-320 (West Supp. 1983-1984); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 12-2451 (West 1982).
89. Needel v. Needel, 15 Ariz. App. 471, 489 P.2d 729 (1971).
90. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-318 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
91. Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 640 P.2d 202 (Ariz. App. 1981).
92. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1064 (West 1983). Diesel Drivers v. Industrial Comm.,
122 Ariz. 184, 593 P.2d 934 (App. 1979), aff'd, 122 Ariz. 116, 593 P.2d 670.
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Idaho
Idaho imposes a duty of support on a father, a mother, and a child
of a poor person. 93 There is no provision for support of children of the
wife by a former marriage.9" Stepparents are included in the definition
of parent only in the Worker's Compensation laws, but a stepchild is
classed as a child in that law only if actually dependent. 9 In implement-
ing a court order against a parent in a proceeding for divorce or child
support, "the court must resort, first, to the community property, then
to the separate property of either party." 96 Apparently, this provision will
apply regardless of which parent has custody. "The separate property of
the husband is not liable for the debts of the wife contracted before the
marriage." 97 "The separate property of the wife is not liable for the debts
of her husband, but is liable for her own debts contracted before or after
marriage." 98 A third person who supplies necessaries for a child under
a parent's charge may recover their reasonable value from the parent.99
This approach could include a stepparent voluntarily supplying necessaries
while the child is in the custody of either parent, but the statute refers
no more to a stepparent than to any other person. No provision for reim-
bursement between the spouses for other debts paid by spouses was located
in Idaho law, probably because community property upon divorce is
assigned as the court deems just.' 0
One is guilty of a felony upon desertion of any child under age 16
"dependent upon him or her for care, education or support."'"' This law
apparently recognizes an in loco parentis position which could be created
by a stepparent or any other volunteer, unless the statute will be inter-
preted to mean legal, not factual dependency.
Nevada
In Nevada, only the natural or adoptive parent of a dependent child
is a "responsible parent'' 0 2 from whose resources a child should be
maintained. 0 3 The Nevada Juvenile Court Act permits the court to direct
orders to stepparents similar to those orders that could be directed to
93. Idaho Code § 32-1002 (1983).
94. Smiley v. Smiley, 46 Idaho 588, 269 P. 589 (1928).
95. Idaho Code § 72-102(7)(c) and (e) (Supp. 1983).
96. Idaho Code § 32-708 (1983). See Fisher v. Fisher, 104 Idaho 68, 656 P.2d 129,
132 (1982).
97. Idaho Code § 32-910 (1983).
98. Idaho Code § 32-911 (1983).
99. Idaho Code § 32-1003 (1983).
100. Idaho Code § 32-712 (1983).
101. Idaho Code § 18-401 (1979).
102. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 425.330 (1979).
103. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 425.340 (1979).
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natural parents.0 °4 For example, a stepparent can be ordered to repay the
county for support and services given to certain children.' 5
Though "[nleither the separate property of a spouse nor his share
of the community property is liable for the debts of the other spouse
contracted before the marriage"' °6 the community property to the extent
of the husband's earnings was held to be subject to his contractual obliga-
tion to support his former wife and the child of his former marriage,
out of due respect for the marital relationship which founded the obliga-
tion not terminated by divorce.' 7 In granting a divorce, the court may
set aside a portion of the property of either spouse for the support of
their children. o'
Texas
Stepmothers are specifically mentioned in the Workers' Compensa-
tion and Crime Victims Compensation statutes of Texas as among those
for whose benefit compensation for death from injury is intended.' 9 Since
stepfathers are not mentioned, the constitutionality of the provision under
the Equal Protection clause is questionable. '"
In the Family Code, "parent" includes only the mother, or the man
to whom the child is legitimate, or an adoptive mother or father, with
no mention of the step-relationship. ' I Such parent has the duty to sup-
port his or her minor child, and if the parent fails in this duty he is
liable to any person who provides necessaries to the child," 2 who might,
of course, be a stepparent.' 3 Nonetheless, if the stepparent has furnished
necessaries voluntarily after placing himself in loco parentis, he may not
be able to recover the cost from the non-custodial parent.'' 4
"A spouse's separate property is not subject to liabilites of the other
spouse unless both spouses are liable by other rules of law."'' 5 Except
for tortious liability of either spouse, for which all community property
is subject if incurred during marriage, community property under joint
control or under the sole control of one spouse is subject to liabilites
(apparently including child support) incurred by that spouse before or dur-
104. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62.044 (1979).
105. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 62.301, 62.311, 62.321 (1979).
106. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.050 (1979).
107. Greear v. Greear, 303 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1962).
108. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150(4) (1979).
109. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306 § 8A (Vernon Supp. 1984).
110. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
111. Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 11.01(3) (Vernon 1975).
112. Tex. Fan. Code Ann. §§ 4.02, 12.04(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
113. Cf. Drescher v. Morgan, 251 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
114. Boyle v. Tully, 134 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
115. Tex. Farn. Code Ann. § 5.61(a) (Vernon 1975).
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ing marriage. But community property under one spouse's sole control
is not subject to the other spouse's liabilites.' 6 Thus Texas not only pro-
tects a spouses's separate proeprty but also part of the community prop-
erty from the other spouse's liabilites. The judge determines the order
in which property subject to liability will be subject to execution.'"
Upon divorce, the court orders a division of the estate of the parties
(apparently both separate and community) as the court deems just and
equitable, with regard for rights of the spouses and "any children of the
marriage.""' Apparently this discretion eliminates any need for codal ar-
ticles on reimbursement. There are many Texas cases on the subject, but
none were located involving support of one spouse's child. The fact that
Texas has no provison for spousal alimony has caused courts to consider
future need for support in unequal divisions of property, but child sup-
port is to be determined by considering the needs of the child, not the
division of the property.
Washington
Washington is the one community property state that has a statute
concerning child support and stepparents:
The expenses of the family and the 'education of the children,
including stepchildren, are chargeable upon the property of both
husband and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they
may be sued jointly or separately. Provided, that with regard to
stepchildren, the obligation shall cease upon the termination of
the relationship of husband and wife.' 9
The provision may seem clear, but in a 1981 case the Supreme Court
of Washington decided that the legislature had not intended the article
to apply to the property of a stepparent married to the non-custodial
parent. In Van Dyke v. Thompson,'20 the stepmother sought an injunc-
tion against the Department of Social and Health Services to prevent them
from ordering her employer to withhold twenty-five percent of her wages
to satisfy her husband's obligation to support his child of a prior mar-
riage. She had been given neither a notice nor a hearing. She contended
the statute should apply only to a stepparent in loco parentis when the
parent has custody, and the court agreed. The court noted that the same
year (1969) that the support statute had been amended to charge step-
parents' property for expenses of the family, including stepchildren, the
legislature had immunized earnings and accumulations of a nonobligated
116. Id. § 5.61 (b)-(d).
117. Id. § 5.62.
118. Id. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
119. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.205 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
120. 95 Wash. 2d 726, 630 P.2d 420 (1981).
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spouse from separate creditors of the obligated spouse, so that as to that
purpose neither spouse should be construed to have any interest in the
earnings of the other.'"' The court considered the amendment to indicate
that the legislature did not intend to eliminate the other immunity. Ap-
parently the court considered support of a child in one's home as a com-
munity obligation and the support of a child by a parent without custody
as a separate obligation that should not affect the earnings of the step-
parent. Thus the court in effect divided the community, the parent's earn-
ings apparently being reachable but not the stepparent's earnings.
As Washington is a state that permits discretionary equitable division'22
rather than equal division at the end of the marriage, it, like other equitable
distribution community property states, has little in the way of statutory
requirements for reimbursement. The spouse of a custodial parent seem-
ingly should not anticipate recovery of earnings spent for a child residing
with the couple.
Washington's crime of family desertion or nonsupport'2 3 punishes
failure to furnish necessities of life to a child or a stepchild, but with
the same proviso as in the civil statute that the obligation ceases upon
termination of the relationship of husband and wife.
Community Property States-Equal Division
California
"The law concerning liability for child support obligations in Califor-
nia is chaotic." '  There are several conflicting statutes relating to the
same subject matter with slight variations.'25 Very recent cases' 6 may have
solved some of the problems, but the statutes have not been amended'27
to conform to the needs indicated by extensive commentary.' 28 Instead,
a lengthy new article was added in 1983 to become effective July 1, 1984.
It begins with a hopeful declaration that "[i]t is the intention of the
Legislature in enacting this section to provide an additional, simplified
121. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.200 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
122. Id. §§ 26.09.050, 26.09.080.
123. Id. § 26.20.030.
124. W. Reppy & C. Samuel, Community Property in the United States 253 (1982).
125. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 196, 196a, 199 (West 1982), 4807, 5127.5, 5127.6 (West 1983).
126. In re Marriage of Shupe, 139 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 189 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983); Woods
v. Woods, 133 Cal. App. 3d 954, 184 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1982); In re Marriage of Havens,
125 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 178 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1981). Cf. cases cited supra note 50.
127. Bruch, supra note 85, at 253-60.
128. See, e.g., Note, Domestic Relations-Stepparent is Liable for Support of Spouse's
Children from Prior Marriage but Tax Returns Are Not Discoverable in Determining Ex-
tent of Liability-in re Marriage of Brown, 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 865 (1981).
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method for the modification of child support awards."' 2 9 Parties are to
make available an income statement and state income tax returns.
An article in the California Civil Code had excused a stepparent from
support of a stepchild, but this article was repealed in 1979.' 30 Another
statute was enacted in 1971,1'1 and another in 1979,132 which together aim
to clarify that the community property interest of a parent in the income
of his or her spouse is available to support any child who resides with
the parent.
California is the only community property state which has adopted
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,' 33 with its definition of child
limited to "son or daughter" and of parent to include "either a natural
parent or an adoptive parent,' ' 34 with a duty to support a "child."' 3
In effect, the stepparent's money can be used to support a child whom
he has no duty to support.
California requires equal division of community property upon dissolu-
tion of the marriage; 3 ' therefore, it regulates reimbursement for contribu-
tion to acquisition of property, if traceable, without interest and not to
exceed the value of the property at the time of the division.' 37
New Mexico
As the classification of separate debts in New Mexico's law does not
mention child support, and as community debts are all others,' 39 such
debts for child support are to be satisfied first from community property,
then from the residence, then from the separate property of the spouse
who incurred the debt. But these priorities apply only while the spouses
are living.
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may set apart
a portion of the property of the respective partners for the maintenance
and education of their minor children,' 0 and may vest title in it to a
conservator."' New Mexico is unique among community property states
129. Cal. Civ. Code § 4700.1 (West Supp. 1984).
130. Id. § 209 (West 1970) (repealed 1979).
131. Cal. Civ. Code § 5127.5.
132. Id. § 5127.6.
133. Id. §§ 241 (West 1982), 242 (West Supp. 1984), 243-245 (West 1982), 246 (West
Supp. 1984), 247-254 (West 1982).
134. Id. § 241.
135. Id. § 242 (West Supp. 1984).
136. Id. § 4800 (West Supp. 1984).
137. Id. § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1984).
138. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-9 (1983).
139. Id. § 40-3-11.
140. Id. § 40-4-7(3).
141. Id. § 40-4-14.
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in that it has no clearcut statute indicating whether upon termination the
assets of the community should be divided equally or with discretion in
the judge.' 42 Cases old' 43 and recent' 4 have required the court to divide
it equally.
Louisiana
The effect of the Civil Code on stepparents discussed above is in-
direct and not likely to be noticed. But stepparents are more overtly
recognized in other areas of Louisiana law. As is true in several states,
Louisiana's Worker's Compensation statute provides death benefits for
"legal dependents,"' 5 then allocates the benefit among them, ranking
children with the widow or widower,' 4 6 and defining children to include
stepchilden.' 47 Louisiana's Income Tax law permits credits for dependents,
defined to include specified step-relationships including stepson, step-
daughter, stepfather or stepmother. 48 Foster- and step-relations are among
those whose consent is sufficient in Louisiana's Medical Consent Law.' 49
Louisiana's welfare statute concerning Aid to Families with Dependent
Children imposes no support obligations on step-relatives, referring to them
only to include them among those relatives in whose residence a depen-
dent child seeking aid must be living while a full-time student deprived
of parental support or care.' 5 ° Aid may "meet the needs of the relative
with whom a dependent child is living, and the spouse of such relative
if living with him."' 5 ' The Department of Health and Human Resources
can enforce and collect the support obligation owed by an absent parent
to his child.' 52
The Louisiana Criminal Code establishes a duty for either parent to
support his or her child, but adds no extended definition of parent nor
of child. Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or intentional non-
support by a spouse of the other spouse, or by either parent of his or
her minor child in destitute or necessitous circumstances. 3
Adoption by a stepparent is possible without the consent of the parent
who is not his or her spouse under certain conditions.' 54 The definition
142. W. McClanahan, Community Property Law in the United States 538 (1982).
143. Sands v. Sands, 48 N.M. 458, 152 P.2d 399 (1944).
144. Michelson v. Michelson, 86 N.M. 107, 520 P.2d 263 (1974).
145. La. R.S. 23:1231 (Supp. 1984).
146. La. R.S. 23:1232 (1964).
147. La. R.S. 23:1021(3) (Supp. 1984).
148. La. R.S. 47:79 (Supp. 1984).
149. La. R.S. 40:1299.55 (1977).
150. La. R.S. 46:231(C)(2) (1982).
151. La. R.S. 46:231A(3) (1982).
152. La. R.S. 46:236.1(B)(1) (1982).
153. La. R.S. 14:74 (Supp. 1984).
154. La. R.S. 9:422.1 (Supp. 1984).
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of "parent" in Louisiana's Code of Juvenile Procedure is extremely broad,
even including under certain circumstances whoever has actual custody
of the child,' which surely could encompass a stepparent. Actual custody
need not extend to holding oneself out as a parent.
Commonly called acting in loco parentis, that status is described
without use of that phrase in a 1981 amendment to an article in the chapter
of the Louisiana Civil Code on intestate succession. The new article
changes the law in several respects; if the deceased leaves no descendants,
his siblings succeed to his separate property subject to a usufruct in favor
of his parents, defined for this purpose to include one "who has openly
and notoriously treated the child as his own and has not refused to sup-
port him."' 56 Given its position following phrases in the article mention-
ing legitimacy and codal methods of filiation, the quoted phase is prob-
ably intended as a recogntion of an additional method of proving
filiation, " but the definitions of parent are listed disjunctively. It will
be interesting to await a contention by a person unrelated to a deceased
by blood or adoption that he has a right to a usufruct because he acted
in loco parentis during the life of the deceased.
None of these Louisiana statutes would lead a stepparent to suspect
that he or she had a duty to support stepchildren. The article in the Civil
Code title on Matrimonial Regimes declaring all alimentary obligations
to be community obligations' at least alerts the stepparent to give up
hope of reimbursement for community funds spent on the spouse's child,
but gives no hint of a burden on the stepparent's separate property. That
burden is not one designed to ensure the child adequate support, but is
instead directed to the spouse who supported his child with separate funds,
and is collectible from the stepparent only if there was a community
regime, and only at its termination.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Most people who marry those who already have children probably
are fully aware at marriage that the children must be supported, and that
the parents they are marrying have a legal and a moral obligation to sup-
port their children. They expect to share their new spouses' responsibilites
as part of sharing the new spouses' lives. Such stepparents probably never
search the law to learn their legal rights and never come to court with
child support problems. This is especially true of those who share their
new homes with their spouses' children. After a period of adjustment,
they probably meld more or less into one family. It is probably almost
155. La. Code Juv. P. art. 13 (11).
156. La. Civ. Code art. 891.
157. The article is referred to as one "which permits a parent to establish filiation"
in Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Persons, 43 La. L. Rev. 535, 537 n.13 (1982).
158. La. Civ. Code art. 2362.
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as true of those who have frequent visitations from children who live
with the other parent.
The problem is far more likely to become a legal matter when the
stepparent never or seldom sees the child, or when there has been some
personal unpleasantness between the spouses of the first and second mar-
riages. But some who consult attorneys are simply and cautiously attempt-
ing to avoid future unpleasantness. Why is the problem more acute and
of more frequent occurrence recently? And how does it happen to in-
volve stepmothers more than stepfathers? Several trends have exacerbated
the problem. In the past, when a man married a woman who had children,
she usually had custody, he was the breadwinner, and he expected to
receive her children into his home and support them. He voluntarily placed
himself in loco parentis. If the marriage ended in divorce, he presumed
that his responsibility had ended. If the marriage ended soon in the death
of the mother, the children probably went to live with her relatives. When
a woman married a man who had children, their mother usually had
custody and their father may have been sending child support to her.
As the husband was the breadwinner as well as the head and master of
the new community regime,' 59 the second wife (stepmother) had little or
no control over their coowned property; if she felt some resentment, there
was little she could do about it. Once married, it was too late to enter into
a contract eliminating the community regime,'6 and unless she was self-
supporting, a separate regime would not be to her advantage. Thus, they
attained some degree of repose.
Today, wives, especially those without children, are likely to be
employed, sharing in the duties of breadwinner. Resentment at use of
community money for the support of the children of another woman,
the prior wife, is more acute when it is not only coowned but co-earned.
Since 1980 in Louisiana, spouses have been able to create a separate regime
or a modified community regime by contract at any time during their
marriage, 6 ' resulting in the continuing search for solutions to problems
that continue to irritate.
People are more mobile today, so that it is not unusual for the blood
parents of the children to live in different communities, losing the per-
sonal contact of frequent visitation or incurring large airline bills for
children traveling alone. There is an increase in custody awards in favor
of fathers, and a slight increase in non-custodial mothers being ordered
to send child support, a trend that can be expected to grow as fathers
are aware that mothers are earning money and, with a new husband, liv-
ing well. The result will be an increasing resentment by second husbands
159. La. Civ. Code art. 2404 (1972 Comp. Ed., in 17 West's La. Stat. Ann.-Civ. Code).
160. La. Civ. Code art. 1790 (1972 Comp. Ed., in 16 West's La. Stat. Ann.-Civ. Code).
161. La. Civ. Code art. 2329.
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at their wives' sending money to another man. Disparity in living stan-
dards between the two families is obvious to the children who do visit,
and causes bitterness, anger, and a sense of deprivation. '62 Their resent-
ment flows over to the parents.
Does Louisiana's unique article, unlike any in other community prop-
erty states, aid by providing a legal solution to the problem, or will it
intensify the problem by a poor solution? Admittedly, the problem of
child support is serious. Few parents ordered to pay it continue to do
so without constant returns to the court for enforcement, and most reci-
pients give up trying to enforce it. Most court awards would be inade-
quate even if they were enforced.' 63 Hence there is a temptation to re-
quire all stepparents to support all stepchildren just as though they were
their own, simply as a means of finding one more source for support.
Both Professor Bruch'6" and a Washington state court 65 have expressed
fear that requiring stepparents to support stepchildren would discourage
marriage and encourage informal cohabitation, contrary to public policy
and lessening the strength of family units as the basis of society.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana's legislation is arbitrary and inconsistent. It defines a com-
munity obligation as one "for the common interest of the spouses or for
the interest of the other spouse," ''6 6 then "deems" an alimentary obliga-
tion imposed by law on a spouse to be a community obligation.' 67 A
separate expression of the legislative will was necessary because it would
be unlikely that alimony sent to a former spouse or to a child in that
spouse's custody would have been interpreted as being for the common
interest of the spouse of the second marriage nor for the stepparent, the
other spouse. This author was appalled at the decision in Connell v.
Connell16 before the 1980 revision and wished it to be legislatively re-
jected, not confirmed, and would urge repeal of article 2362 so that alimen-
tary obligations would be separate obligations because not for the com-
mon interest of the spouses. This change would not deprive the child of
support from his parent's separate property and from the property of
the new community,' 69 but at termination of the community regime the
parent spouse would owe reimbursement to the other spouse of one-half
162. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Prop-
erty, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1263 (1981).
163. Id. at 1253-60.
164. Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique of Current
Practice, 16 U.C.D. L. Rev. 49, 60 (1982).
165. Van Dyke v. Thompson, 95 Wash. 726, 630 P.2d 420, 423 (1981).
166. La. Civ. Code art. 2360.
167. La. Civ. Code art. 2362.
168. 331 So. 2d 4 (La. 1976).
169. La. Civ. Code art. 2345.
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of the amount or value that the community property had at the time it
was used. 7
If repeal of the article deeming alimentary obligations to be separate
obligations does not occur, this author urges amendment of article 2365
to declare:
If separate property has been used to satisfy a community
obligation, including an alimentary obligation, the spouse, upon
termination of the community property regime, is entitled to reim-
bursement for one-half of the amount or value that the property
had at the time it was used. Reimbursement need only be made
to the extent of community assets.
The balance of the article would remain as it is except for deletion of
reference to obligations "for the support, maintenance, and education of
children of either spouse." ' 7l Thus the stepparent's separate property no
longer could be burdened with obligations incurred by the other spouse,
whether community or separate, except by his own action at termination'
or before. The stepchild should be supported only by his parents, so as
not to add an unnecessary irritant to the marriage of his parent and
stepparent.
No other state has imposed on stepparents' property interests as
harshly as has Louisiana. As the Washington court said, requiring the
earnings of the spouse of a non-custodial parent to be taken for child
support "would place unwarranted stress upon a second marriage which
is already faced with the tensions and demands both emotional and finan-
cial of dealing with children of the first marriage."' 73 It is here recom-
mended that the stepparent's property be unavailable to a stepchild
regardless of whether the child lives with the couple. If this occurs, and
love grows, law will not be an issue within the household, nor need it be.
"Cinderella Revisited" is the title of one law review article'74 and
the subtitle of another.' A law review article defending the rights of
Cinderella's stepmother could not have been forshawowed by the mood
of that ancient tale. She might have been pleasenter had she not been
so irritated by fear of her money being used for her husband's daughter.
Let the law require that blood parents fulfill their parental duties, but
it should allow the step-relatives to work out their relationships without
added irritation. Cinderella will not be any the worse for it, and may
be better.
170. La. Civ. Code art. 2364.
171. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 2365.
172. La. Civ. Code art. 2357.
173. 630 P.2d at 423.
174. Comment, Cinderella Revisited, 10 San Fern. V.L. Rev. 103 (1982).
175. Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Relationship: Cinderella Revisited,
4 Fam. L. Q. 209 (1970).
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